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Abstract—A pilot spoofer can paralyze the channel estima-
tion in multi-user orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing
(OFDM) systems by using the same publicly-known pilot tones as
legitimate nodes. This causes the problem of pilot authentication
(PA). To solve this, we propose, for a two-user multi-antenna
OFDM system, a code-frequency block group (CFBG) coding
based PA mechanism. Here multi-user pilot information, after
being randomized independently to avoid being spoofed, are
converted into activation patterns of subcarrier-block groups on
code-frequency domain. Those patterns, though overlapped and
interfered mutually in the wireless transmission environment, are
qualified to be separated and identified as the original pilots
with high accuracy, by exploiting CFBG coding theory and
channel characteristic. Particularly, we develop the CFBG code
through two steps, i.e., 1) devising an ordered signal detection
technique to recognize the number of signals coexisting on
each subcarrier block, and encoding each subcarrier block with
the detected number; 2) constructing a zero-false-drop (ZFD)
code and block detection based (BD) code via k-dimensional
Latin hypercubes and integrating those two codes into the
CFBG code. This code can bring a desirable pilot separation
error probability (SEP), inversely proportional to the number of
occupied subcarriers and antennas with a power of k. To apply
the code to PA, a scheme of pilot conveying, separation and
identification is proposed. Based on this novel PA, a joint channel
estimation and identification mechanism is proposed to achieve
high-precision channel recovery and simultaneously enhance PA
without occupying extra resources. Simulation results verify the
effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, pilot spoofing attack,
authentication, code-frequency block group coding, OFDM
I. INTRODUCTION
S
ECURITY in mobile radio communication systems em-
braces a set of ideas, including authentication [1], confi-
dentiality [2]–[5], integrity, among others. Basically, authen-
tication functions as the foremost security mechanism since
it guarantees the identities of legitimate entities and authentic
data. This calls for two paradigms of authentication, including
the entity authentication that very often justifies the identities
of the parties taking part, and the data origin authentication
that aims to confirm the identity of a data originator [6]. With
those two functionalities increasingly challenged by the rise of
novel security threats, upper-layer authentication and physical
layer authentication (PLA) gradually comes to serve as two
necessary implementation techniques throughout the current
network protocol stack. For the upper layer authentication,
identity messages are encrypted via cryptographic method
whereas, for the PLA mechanism, a legitimate terminal is
authenticated if its destination node can successfully de-
modulate and decode its transmission [7]. In reality, PLA,
as a complementary mechanism, helps enhance the overall
authentication efficiency.
In spite of such a comprehensive authentication architecture,
security issues, rather than suffering a weakening trend, have
been increasingly raised when the network becomes more
complicated [8] and the threats grow more powerful [9]. Mean-
while, though we have to also admit the vulnerability of upper-
layer authentication under intruders with massive computing
power [10], some physical-layer protocols, e.g., those verifying
communicating identities through publicly-known PLA but
without being unprotected, actually now arouse huge attentions
from adversaries that can easily spoof those identities, at
least without too much overheads. This seems a better choice
for any malicious entity and thus legitimate systems require
more specialized mechanism to safeguard PLA and protect its
effectiveness [11].
For example, OFDM technique, being universally deployed
in current commercial and military applications, is very vul-
nerable to the security breaches on its predefined protocols.
These agreements, necessarily configured between transceiver
pairs, are originally designed to combat the multi-path influ-
ence in wireless environment [12]. A well-known protocol
in OFDM systems is to share a predefined signal structure
known as the pilot tone. The signal, like the pilot symbol
employed in various networks [13], [14], actually acts as
a key between transceiver pair for acquiring channel state
information (CSI) [15]. Basically, this process is also a kind
of PLA that authenticates the sender and receiver, since the
authentication signal from a legitimate sender, that is, publicly-
known and deterministic pilot tone, is verified and, therefore,
known at the receiver. However, an adversary that is aware
of the specific pilot tones used, can nowadays exploit this
to spoof the network. This is done, in theory, by perfectly
imitating the pilot tones of a legitimate terminal instead of
aggravating data payload directly [16], [17]. This spoofing
behavior can completely break down the uniqueness of the
traditional pilot-sharing protocols and induce contaminated
and imprecise channel estimation samples that are then not
recovered.
This motivates us to develop the concept of pilot authentica-
tion (PA), kind of secure and data-origin PLA mechanism for
wireless OFDM systems, namely, can the pilot tone from any
legitimate node be authenticated through wireless multiuser
channels while hardly being spoofed? We show that the answer
is yes, with the performance subject to specifically identified
tradeoffs between the time-frequency-domain resources and
antenna resources. The scenario we consider is an uplink
multi-antenna OFDM system where two legitimate users,
2respectively named as Bob and Charlie, communicate with an
uplink receiver Alice threatened by a spoofer denoted by Eva.
Unlike the anti-spoofing mechanism in [16], [17] for single-
user protection, one more user incurs a significant difficulty on
countermeasures. The key challenge lies in the fact that Alice
has to avoid the attack and simultaneously guarantee the PA
between legitimate nodes, i.e., Bob and Charlie.
Therefore, we, in this paper, first address the design issue
of PA that could resolve above challenges. The first step we
introduce is to randomize the pilot tones. The randomization
incurs a hybrid attack that embraces spoofing, silence and
jamming behaviors but inspires us to rethink and redesign
the fundamental PA process through three key procedures,
i. e., pilot conveying, separation and identification. A code-
frequency block group (CFBG) coding based PA mecha-
nism is proposed in which subcarrier blocks are encoded
to authenticate pilots and simultaneously reused for channel
estimation. This mechanism reuses the time-frequency and
antenna resources original for channel estimation and therefore
requires no extra resource support. The related contributions
are summarized as follows:
1) Recognizing a hybrid attack, we build up a 4-hypothesis
testing and devise an ordered eigenvalue-ratio detection
technique to recognize the number of signals coexisting.
An analytical requirement of subcarriers and antennas is
derived and configured for one subcarrier block in such
a way that precise number of signals can be identified
on the block. The number is encoded into binary number
information and, therefore, each subcarrier block can be
precisely encoded with binary number information.
2) Thanks to the coded subcarrier blocks, a code-frequency
domain can be identified. On this domain, we develop
a CFBG coding theory, constituted by a zero-false-drop
(ZFD) code and block detection (BD) code. To construct
the ZFD code, we exploit the concept of k-dimensional
Latin hypercubes of order q. We validate that this code
can be constructed when k ≥ 3 and q ≥ 3 and cannot
be otherwise. Interestingly, the required BD code has
the same codeword set but different codeword arithmetic
principle as the ZFD code.
3) Based on the CFBG code, we derive a CFBG codebook
through which multiuser pilot information is enabled to
be conveyed, separated and identified in the form of
codewords. This is done in practice by a proposed block
detection based codeword decoding (BDCD) algorithm.
Theoretically, the concept of separation error probability
(SEP) is formulated and proved to be proportional to
the parameter (1/NTotalNT)
k
where NTotal and NT
respectively represent the number of subcarriers and
antennas occupied. Moreover, we show how the pilot
identification error occurs and how the identification
enhancement benefits from the previous process of pilot
conveying and separation.
4) In order to enhance identification and further guarantee
the channel estimation high precision, we develop a
joint channel estimation and identification mechanism.
Here, a minimum-mean square error (MMSE) semi-
blind estimator is devised to estimate the frequency-
domain subcarriers (FS) and channel impulse response
(CIR) of Bob and Charlie. Thanks to the estimated
channels, the diversity of spatial correlation of different
nodes is exploited, thus improving the pilot identification
efficiently. We formulate the identification error proba-
bility (IEP) and derive its asymptotic expression under a
large number of antennas. Numerical results show that
the non-zero IEP occurs only when Eva has identical
spatial correlation matrix with Bob and/or Charlie.
The rest of the paper is summarized as follows. We begin by
briefly reviewing related work in Section II. In Section III,
we present an overview of pilot spoofing attack on two-user
multi-antenna OFDM systems. A framework of CFBG coding
based PA is proposed in Section IV. In what follows, four
key techniques are introduced. An attack detection method
and its simulated performance are demonstrated in Section V.
A code construction scheme and the codebook performance
evaluation are formulated in Section VI. A pilot encoding
and decoding mechanism is presented in Section VII and a
joint channel estimation and identification scheme is given
in Section VIII with comprehensive simulation validation.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section IX.
Notations: Boldface is used for matrixes A. A∗, AT,
AH, A+respectively denotes conjugate, transpose, conjugate
transpose and pseudoinverse of matrix A. ‖·‖ denotes the
Euclidean norm of a vector or a matrix. E {·} is the expectation
operator. The operator ⊗ is the Kronecker product. diag {·}
stands for the diagonal matrix with the column vector on its
diagonal. {·}+ denotes the the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse.
II. RELATED WORKS
Basically, PA, a kind of data origin authentication, involves
two aspects, i.e., verifying data integrity and authenticity.
Authenticating pilot signals under pilot spoofing attack mainly
refers to confirming their authenticity. This process includes
how to detect the alteration to authenticity and how to protect
and further maintain the high authenticity. Much work have
been extensively investigated on those areas from narrow-band
single-carrier system [18]–[25] to wide-band multi-carrier
system [16], [26]–[28].
Authors in [18] introduced for a narrow-band single-carrier
system a pilot spoofing attack, that is, an active eavesdropper
disturbs the normal channel estimation by transmitting the
same pilot signals as the legitimate nodes. Following [18],
much research has studied the spoofing detection by exploiting
the physical layer information, such as auxiliary training
or data sequences [19]–[22] and some prior-known channel
information [23], [24]. Different from those detection oriented
schemes, the author in [25] proposed a joint spoofing detection
and mitigation strategy to protect the authenticity of channel
estimation samples. When a spoofing attack is detected, the
contaminated part of the pilot-superimposed data is deleted
and then the remnant data part is employed to achieve authen-
tication and estimate CSI.
The attack methodology on OFDM systems becomes very
different since an intelligent spoofer, actually serving as a
3protocol-aware attacker, can stealthily imitate any behaviors of
legitimate nodes except a completely random behavior [26].
Therefore, the common sense of countermeasures is to com-
pletely randomize the locations and values of regular pilot
tones. Clancy et al. in [27] first introduced the behavior of
misguiding the CSI estimation process by spoofing pilot tones
in OFDM systems. Employing randomized pilot tones with
their locations obeying different probability distributions, au-
thors in [28] presented a comprehensive analysis of decoding
benefits brought by pilot randomization. Besides those, authors
in [16] proposed a pilot encoding-and-decoding mechanism to
achieve robust PA while providing precise CSI estimation.
However, those work only focus on the single-user scenario
and do not specify the PA issue existing in practical multi-user
OFDM systems over frequency-selective fading channels.
III. PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK ON TWO-USER
MULTI-ANTENNA OFDM SYSTEMS:
OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES
We in this section begin our discussion by outlining a
fundamental overview of pilot spoofing attack, including the
basic system and problem model as well as the signal and
channel estimation model. Then we describe a common-sense
technique, i.e., pilot randomization, to defend against pilot
spoofing attack and identify the existing key challenges.
A. System Description and Problem Model
We consider an uplink two-user single-input multiple-output
(SIMO)-OFDM systems where an uplink receiver named Alice
is equipped with NT antennas and two uplink transmitters,
respectively denoted by Bob and Charlie, are each configured
with single antenna. A block diagram of such a system using
time division duplex (TDD) mode over frequency-selective
fading channels is depicted in Fig. 1. Pilot tone based channel
estimation is considered in the uplink. Conventionally, PA,
an unavoidable step before channel estimation, is achieved
by assigning Bob and Charlie with publicly-known and de-
terministic pilot tones that can be identified. This mechanism,
a kind of data-driven PLA, is very fragile and actually has
no privacy. The problem is that a malicious node Eva with
single antenna can impersonate Bob or Charlie synchronously
by using the same pilot tones, without need of imitating their
identities. In this way, Eva can misguide the multi-user channel
estimation that is acquired at Alice by linear decorrelation
based on pilot tones. The disturbed CSI, once utilized for
downlink transmission in TDD systems, can induce serious
information leakage to Eva.
B. SIMO Received Signal Model
Let us first turn to the representation of signal model.
At each transmit (receive) antenna of nodes, the conven-
tional OFDM modulator (demodulator) is equipped to map
bit streams into frequency-domain signals transmitted on N
subcarriers. OFDM symbols transmitted from Bob, Charlie
and Eva at time index k are denoted by vectors xj [k] ∈
CN×1, j ∈ {B,C,E}. Those vectors are processed by inverse
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Fig. 1. Uplink two-user OFDM system model under pilot spoofing attack.
fast Fourier transform (IFFT) and then each added with a
cyclic prefix of length p to combat the multi-path influence.
Generally, it is assumed that p ≥ L − 1, where L is the
maximum length of all channels. After removing the cyclic
prefix at the i-th receive antenna, Alice derives the time-
domain signal vector yi [k] ∈ CN×1 written as
yi [k] = HiC,BF
HxB [k] +H
i
C,CF
HxC [k]
+ HiC,EF
HxE [k] + v
i [k] (1)
whereHiC,B,H
i
C,C andH
i
C,E are the N×N circulant matrices
of Bob, Charlie and Eva, with the first column respectively
given by
[
hi
T
B 01×(N−L)
]T
,
[
hi
T
C 01×(N−L)
]T
, and[
hi
T
E 01×(N−L)
]T
. Those L by 1 CIR vectors to the i-th
receive antenna of Alice, i.e., hiB, h
i
C and h
i
E, are mutually
independent with each other. The channel power delay profile
(PDP) of Bob, Charlie and Eva at the j-th path to the i-th
antenna of Alice are respectively denoted by σ2B,j,i, σ
2
C,j,i, and
σ2E,j,i. Without loss of generality, channel PDPs are normalized
so that
L∑
j=1
σ2l,j,i = 1, ∀i, ∀l ∈ {B,C,E} are satisfied. The
CIRs of different paths exhibit spatially uncorrelated Rayleigh
fading for each receiving antenna and CIRs of different
antennas are assumed to be spatially correlated for each
path. The receive correlation matrix of signals from Bob,
Charlie and Eva are respectively denoted by RB, RC and RE.
vi [k] ∈ CN×1 denotes the vector of i.i.d. random variable
satisfying CN (0, σ2) where σ2 is noise power. F denotes
the N × N unitary DFT matrix and it is easy to show that
the eigenvalue decomposition of HiC,j , j ∈ {B,C,E} leads
to HiC,j = F
Hdiag
{√
NF
[
hi
T
j 01×(N−L)
]T}
F, j ∈
{B,C,E}. Taking FFT of received signals, Alice finally ob-
tains the version of N by 1 frequency-domain signals y˜i [k]
at the i-th receive antenna as
y˜i [k] = diag
{√
NF
[
hi
T
B 01×(N−L)
]T}
xB [k]
+ diag
{√
NF
[
hi
T
C 01×(N−L)
]T}
xC [k]
4+ diag
{√
NF
[
hi
T
E 01×(N−L)
]T}
xE [k] +w
i [k]
(2)
where wi [k] = Fvi [k] ∈ CN×1 is the DFT projection of
the random vector vi [k]. We see that since vi [k] is isotropic,
wi [k] has the same distribution as vi [k], i.e., a vector of
i.i.d. CN (0, σ2) random variables. After simplification, the
received signal is transformed into:
y˜i [k] = diag {xB [k]}FLhiB + diag {xC [k]}FLhiC
+ diag {xE [k]}FLhiE +wi [k] (3)
where FL =
√
NF (:, 1 : L). Next, we make assumptions:
Assumption 1. We assume xB [k] = xB [k]1N×1 and
xC [k] = xC [k]1N×1 where 1N×1 is a column vector
whose elements are equally to be one. Alternatively, we can
superimpose those pilots onto a dedicated pilot sequence
optimized under a non-security oriented scenario and utilize
this new pilot for training. At this point, xB [k], xC [k] can
be an additional phase difference for security consideration.
Signals transmitted by Eva can be denoted by diag {xE [k]} =
xE [k]E where E has dimension N ×N and is unknown.
We denote the pilot tones at k-th symbol time by
xB [k] , xC [k] , xE [k] with xB [k] =
√
ρBe
jθk , xC [k] =√
ρCe
jβk , xE [k] =
√
ρEe
jϕk where ρB, ρC and ρE respec-
tively denote the transmitting power of Bob, Charlie and Eva.
Assumption 2. We assume that pilot tones across adjacent
symbol time are kept with fixed phase difference for each le-
gitimate node. In this principle, we define θj+1−θj = θ, j ≥ 0,
βj+1 − βj = β, j ≥ 0 where θ, β are fixed and known by all
parties.
Assumption 3. Alice can acquireRB andRC perfectly except
RE. As a basic system configuration, at least four OFDM
symbols are assumed to be within one coherence time.
C. Channel Estimation Model Under Spoofed Pilots
Now let us turn to describe the estimation models of FS
channels. We note that Eq. (3) is transformed into:
y˜i [k] = FLh
i
BxB [k] +FLh
i
CxC [k] +EFLh
i
ExE [k] +w
i [k]
(4)
The spoofing pilots make E an identity matrix. Stacking
the received signals across NT antennas, Alice obtains the
received signals as:
y [k] = xB [k]hB + xC [k]hC + xE [k]hE +w [k] (5)
Here, we have y [k] =
[
y˜1
T
[k] , . . . , y˜NT
T
[k]
]
∈
C1×NNT , hj =
[ (
FLh
1
j
)T
, . . . ,
(
FLh
NT
j
)T ] ∈
C1×NNT , j ∈ {B,C,E} and there exists w [k] =[
w1
T
[k] , . . . , wNT
T
[k]
]
∈ C1×NNT . Collecting sig-
nals within two OFDM symbols, i.e. k1 and k2, Alice can
further derive
Ŷ=xBhB+xChC + xEhE +w (6)
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Fig. 2. Methodology for CFBG coding based PA, including coding based
PA and channel based PA. Particularly, coding based PA provides the basis
of channel based PA which enhances coding based PA as well. The overall
process embraces two key ideas and four vital implementing techniques. The
ultimate result is to achieve resilient PA and high-precision channel estimation
simultaneously.
where Ŷ =
[
yT [k1] y
T [k2]
]T
, xj =[
xj [k1] xj [k2]
]T
, j ∈ {B,C,E} and there exists
w =
[
wT [k1] w
T [k2]
]T
.
We consider the configuration of orthogonal pilots, namely,
x+BxC = 0,x
+
CxB = 0, to put an explicit interpretation on the
security problem, that is, a least square (LS) estimation of hB
or hC, contaminated by hE with a noise bias, is given by:
ĥcon =
{
hB + hE + x
+
Bw if xE = xB
hC + hE + x
+
Cw if xE = xC
(7)
Basically, employing any nonorthogonal pilots causes the
similar phenomenon. Therefore, the estimate value depends
on which pilot is spoofed by Eva.
Problem 1. Alice cannot distinguish which legitimate user
is being spoofed since any prior information of the attack
decision made by Eva is unavailable at Alice.
Obviously, only one spoofer can completely paralyze the
whole channel estimation process for multiple users.
Remark 1. For single user scenario, Alice is only required to
avoid pilot spoofing attack. However, in this two-user scenario,
significant difference lies in the fact that Alice has to addi-
tionally guarantee the PA between legitimate nodes. Basically,
Alice has to first guarantee the PA between legitimate nodes,
i.e., Bob and Charlie under the circumstance of random pilots,
and then avoid the Problem 1. In fact, the random pilots incur
huge difficulties for PA between Bob and Charlie and this issue
becomes more challenging under hybrid attack
D. Novel Attack Environment and One Critical Challenge
Pilot randomization usually serves as a prerequisite for effi-
ciently paralyzing the pilot spoofing attack. The commonsense
is that Bob and Charlie independently randomize their own
pilot tones [12], [16]. In practice, the randomization of pilot
tone values is employed for CIR estimation. Theoretically, the
probability of being spoofed is zero in this case.
However, those pilot tones of continuous values, when
utilized for PA, have to be quantized into discrete values in
a limited alphabet with high resolution, for convenience of
sharing between transceiver [16]. More specifically, each of
5candidate pilot phases for CIR estimation is mapped into a
unique quantized sample, chosen from the set A defined by
A = {ejθ : θ ∼ U [0, 2pi)} where U denotes the uniform dis-
tribution. This can be achieved by multiplying the traditional
OFDM pilot tones with suitable sequences δB [k] and δC [k].
Anyway, the pilots utilized for estimation are continuous for
avoiding attack while those utilized for PA must be discrete,
influenced by the quantization precision. The limited-alphabet
representation of pilot tones brings PA a novel problem:
Problem 2. Eva imitates to select random pilot phases ϕ
satisfying ϕj+1 − ϕj = ϕ, j ≥ 0 from A and launches a
spoofing attack, denoted by randomly-imitating attack. More-
over, Eva that is inspired to keep silent is also able to cheat
Bob and Charlie to adopt random pilots, without costing any
extra resource. This is denoted by a silence cheating mode.
What’s worse, Eva can also launch pilot jamming attack
with arbitrary jamming signals, in a stealthy way under the
“shield” of the enjoinment of pilot randomization . Basically,
Eva can launch a hybrid attack, that is, combination of
randomly-imitating attack, silence cheating, and pilot jamming
attack. Those behaviors are generally unpredictable.
Besides this, pilot randomization imposes on PA complex
interference caused by user randomness and independence.
Under this circumstance, the randomized pilot information is
non-recoverable and thus the secure delivery of pilot informa-
tion is challenging in the following sense:
Problem 3. Those randomized and independent pilots, if
utilized for authentication through multiuser channels, will
be hidden in the random channel environment and cannot be
separated, let alone identified.
IV. FRAMEWORK OF CODE-FREQUENCY BLOCK GROUP
CODING BASED PILOT AUTHENTICATION
In this section, we identify the key points required for the
design of secure PA. We develop a CFBG coding based PA
framework in Fig. 2 with the following general description for
its core components. .
A. Core of PA under Hybrid Attack
Naturally, rethinking Problem 3 inspires us to redesign the
overall PA process as pilot conveying, separation and identi-
fication. Correspondingly, we have to answer three questions,
including 1) How to correctly convey randomized pilots of any
legitimate node to Alice? 2) How to separate multiple pilots
hidden in the wireless environment with high precision? 3)
how to then reliably identify those separated pilot? To answer
the questions mentioned above, we identify the coding based
PA in the following way:
Fact 1. Perform pilot conveying on code domain through a
codebook medium with the potential for excellent abilities of
pilot separation and identification under hybrid attack.
B. CFBG Coding Based PA
For this concept, we stress that the advantages of informa-
tion coding and channel characteristic are exploited jointly.
Subcarrier blocks are reused by randomized pilots for channel
estimation and simultaneously encoded for resilient PA. Gen-
erally, this process includes a coding based PA and a channel
based PA. The relationship between the two methods is shown
in Fig. 2, embracing four steps.
1) Step I: Construction of Detection Based Binary Number
System : Basically, in order to find the desirable codebook,
we need to acquire efficient features that are easy to encode
and decode. A fact is that the activation patterns of subcarrier
blocks of given certain size can be represented by digit 1or
0, depending on whether those subcarriers are activated or
not. Hinted by this, our goal in this part is to determine the
block size, precisely detect the activation patterns of each
subcarrier block, and finally encode the results into binary
digits. To achieve this, a block detection technique is proposed
and detailed in Section V. In this way, assuming the whole
subcarriers are divided and grouped into B blocks each of
which has N/B subcarriers, we can define a set of binary
code vector as S = {s| si ∈ {0, 1} , 1 ≤ i ≤ Ls} where Ls
denotes the maximum length of the code.
2) Step II: Code-Frequency Block Group Coding: In order
to formulate the codebook medium required, we first construct
a code frequency domain on the basis of the binary number
system. It is constituted by a set of pairs (c, b) in Fig. 3(a),
where c ∈ S and b, 1 ≤ b ≤ B is an integer which represents
the subcarrier block index of appearance of the code. B is
the maximum number of available blocks supported. In what
follows, by grouping and scheduling multiple binary digits on
code-frequency domain, we have the potential for formulating
a codebook, for example, with the dimension of B by C if
patterns of total number C are supported. The key requirement
is developing a suitable coding method such that a mapping
from a codeword to the activation patterns is formulated and
unique patterns can be created extensively. Further optimizing
the code, we could construct the codebook achieving Fact 1 by
a technique of CFBG coding which is detailed in Section VI.
3) Step III: Pilot Conveying, Separation and Identifica-
tion via Code: Based on the theoretical codebook, we turn
to the practical construction of conveying, separation and
identification of pilot phase information. At this point, pilot
conveying means encoding pilot phases into activation patterns
through the codebook. Pilot separation and identification func-
tions to achieve resilient decoding of phase information from
the observed patterns, disturbed under multi-user codeword
interference and hybrid attack. An implementation of the
overall process in two-user OFDM systems is indicated in
Fig. 3(b), including three components, i.e., a Block Identity
(ID) Mapper, a Block Creator, a Detector and a Identifer.
The key is the proposed pilot encoding and decoding technique
which is further detailed in Section VII.
4) Step IV: Channel Estimation and Identification Enhance-
ment: On the basis of coding based PA, identified pilots
are utilized for channel estimation. Channel based PA is
performed at an Estimator. The principle is that the spatial
correlation property of estimated channels are employed for
enhancing pilot identification. The detailed technique is shown
in Section VIII. In the following sections, we will extend the
four key techniques in details.
663 0RGXODWRU0RGXODWRU ,))7 36 '$ 5)
[ ]%σ k
[ ]&σ k
%RE
%ORFN
&UHDWRU
&KDUOLH
:LUHOHVV
&KDQQHO
$OLFH
 
3LORW5DQGRPL]DWLRQ 3LORW(QFRGLQJ0DSSLPJDQG,QVHUWLRQ
[ ]% k[
$WWDFN
))7 63 '$ 5),GHQWLILHU 
[ ]% k[

&KDQQHO(VWLPDWLRQ ,GHQWLILFDWLRQ(QKDQFHPHQW
%ORFN'HWHFWLRQDQG
3LORW'HFRGLQJ{

3DWWHUQ 3DWWHUQC








B


D E
(YD
&)%*&RGLQJ
EF




B
B
B
%ORFN,'
0DSSHU
63 0RGXODWRU0RGXODWRU ,))7 36 '$ 5)
%ORFN
&UHDWRU 
%ORFN,'
0DSSHU
'HWHFWRU&KDQQHO(VWLPDWRU
[ ]& k[
[ ]& k[
Fig. 3. Theoretical support and practical implementation for CFBG coding
based PA mechanism; (a) General description of CFBG coding theory on code-
frequency domain; (b) Implementation framework of CFBG coding based PA
mechanism for a two-user uplink OFDM systems.
V. KEY TECHNIQUE I: BLOCK DETECTION
In this section, we present how to exploit signal detection
technique to execute the step I.
A. Construction of 4-Hypotheses Testing
Observing the possible number i of signals coexisting on
one block, we can respectively define the hypotheses by
Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 under which the received signals stacked
in four OFDM symbols, can be represented by
Y = DH+W (8)
Here, we have Y =
[
yT[ki]0≤i≤3
]T
∈ C4×NNT , and
W =
[
wT[ki]0≤i≤3
]T
∈ C4×NNT . The components of
H ∈ Ci×NNT and D ∈ C4×i are selected from hj and xj ,
j ∈ {B,C,E}, depending on the specific nodes coexisting
on one block. Note that additive vector W is independent
of channel vectors H. We define the covariance matrix by
R = 1
NTN
YYH. According to the law of large number
(LLN), the following equation can be satisfied:
R
a.s.−−−−−−→
NTN→∞
1
NTN
EH
{
DHHHDH
}
+
1
NTN
EW
{
WWH
}
(9)
Examining the equation, we know that the rank of first
term is equal to i under Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and the rank of
second term is always four. Under the hypothesis of H1,
the eigenvalues of R with the exception of the largest one
can all be approximately equal to the noise variance σ2. The
approximation becomes exact as NTN → ∞. Therefore, it
is possible to infer the absence or presence of the signals
by comparing the largest eigenvalue with the smallest one.
Similarly, the existence of i-th signals 2 ≤ i ≤ 3, under the
hypothesis ofHi, depends on the comparison of the i-th largest
eigenvalue with the smallest one.
B. Ordered Signal Detection
Three detectors are required to detect the possible number
of signals on each block. In the descending order of eigen-
value values, we denote the predesigned detectors respectively
by (Maximum-Minimum ) MM detector, (Second-Maximum-
Minimum) SMM detector, (Third-Maximum-Minimum) TMM
detector. We formulate the normalized covariance matrix as
R̂ = 1
σ2
YYH ∈ C4×4 and suppose that the ordered eigen-
value of R̂ are λ1 > λ2 > λ3 > λ4 > 0. The test statistics
are therefore respectively denoted by
TMM =
λ1
λ4
, TSMM =
λ2
λ4
, TTMM =
λ3
λ4
(10)
A unified decision threshold, denoted by γ, is configured using
TMM
H1
≷
H0
γ, TSMM
H2
≷
H2
γ, TTMM
H3
≷
H3
γ (11)
whereH2 andH3 represent two alternative hypotheses that are
respectively contrary to the hypothesis H2 and H3. Therefore,
identifying the exact number of signals on one block can be
achieved by an ordered detection and decision for composite
hypotheses. For example, the existence of only one signal is
equivalent to successfully verifying H3, then H2 and finally
H1. Generally, the testing performance is measured by the
probability of detection (PD) and the probability of false alarm
(PF) which are respectively denoted for each detector by
PMMD = Pr (H1|H1) ,PMMF = Pr (H1|H0)
PSMMD = Pr (H2|H2) ,PSMMF = Pr
(
H2| H2
)
PTMMD = Pr (H3|H3) ,PTMMF = Pr
(
H3| H3
) (12)
Remark 2. The number of signals coexisting on one subcar-
rier block is not deterministic due to the random activation
patterns and cannot be predicted in advance. Therefore, the
common decision threshold γ could guarantee that the number
of signals could be always precisely detected using a single
threshold. Furthermore, this setup ensures an analytical ex-
pression of γ in the following.
C. Determination of γ
Examing Eq. (10), we stress that the first step is to determine
the joint moments of two arbitrary eigenvalues. Then we derive
the closed-form decision threshold γ based on the probability
density function (PDF) approximated from those moments.
1) Determination of Moments: Considering R̂ under hy-
potheses H0, we find that the joint distribution of first eigen-
value and smallest one is equivalent to that of a Wishart matrix
satisfying CW (NTN, I4) [29]. Under Hi for 2 ≤ i ≤ 3,
the joint distribution of i-th eigenvalue with smallest one is
equivalent to that of the Wishart matrix. Finally, a closed
expression of joint moments of λi and λj is calculated by:
E
(
λmi λ
n
j
)
=
∑
{a,b,c,d}⊆{A1∪A2}
KBa,b,c,dfi,j,m,n (a, b, c, d)
(13)
where
{i, j,m, n} ⊆

{1, 4, 1, 1} , {1, 4,m, 0} , {1, 4, 0, n} ,
{2, 4, 1, 1} , {2, 4,m, 0} , {3, 4, 1, 1} ,
{3, 4,m, 0} , 1 ≤ m,n ≤ 2
 (14)
Here there exist A1= {{a, b, c, d} |{a, b, c, d} ⊆ {0 ∪ B1}},
and A2= {{a, b, c, d} |{a, b, c, d} ⊆ B2}. For B1 and B2,
B1=
{S{2,4,6},S{2,5,5},S{3,3,6},S{3,4,5},S{4,4,4}} (15)
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Fig. 4. Simulations of joint-PDF approximation and detection performance; (a) Analytical joint PDFs under NNT = 20 (based on approximation approach
with ρ1 = 0.16, ρ2 = 0.26, ρ3 = 0.43); (b) Simulated joint PDFs under NNT = 20 (based on empirical approach); (c) PF versus γ under ρ1 = 0.16,
ρ2 = 0.26, ρ3 = 0.43, and NTN = 20.
f2,4,m,0 (a, b, c, d) =
N+a−4∑
k1=0
K2
(
k1 + k1 +m
)
!k1!
k1!2k2+k1+m+1
−
N+a−4∑
k1=0
k2∑
k2=0
K2
(
k2 + k1 + k2 +m
)
!k1!
k1!k2!3k2+k1+k2+m+1
−
N+a−4∑
k1=0
N+d−4∑
k2=0
K2
(
k2 + k1 +m
)
!
(
k1 + k2
)
!
k1!k2!2k1+k2+12k2+k1+m+1
+
N+a−4∑
k1=0
N+d−4∑
k2=0
k2+k2∑
k3=0
K2
(
k1 + k2
)
!
(
k2 + k1 + k3 +m
)
!
k1!k2!k3!2k2+k2−k3+14k2+k1+k3+m+1
(17)
f3,4,m,0 (a, b, c, d) =
N+a−4∑
k1=0
k2+k1∑
k2=0
K2
(
k1 + k2 +m
)
!
(
k2 + k1
)
!
k1!k2!2k2+k1−k2+13k1+k2+m+1
−
N+a−4∑
k1=0
k2+k1∑
k2=0
N+d−4∑
k3=0
K2
(
k1 + k2 + k3 +m
)
!
(
k2 + k1
)
!
k1!k2!k3!2k2+k1−k2+14k1+k2+k3+m+1
(18)
f2,4,1,1 (a, b, c, d) =
k3−m∑
k1=0
k1∑
k2=0
k1+k2+m∑
k3=0
(
k3 −m
)
!
(
k1 + k2 +m
)
!k3! (k4 − k1 − 1)!
k1!k2!k3!2N+b+k1−k3+m−34N+d+k2+k3+m−3
−
k3−m∑
k1=0
k1∑
k2=0
k2+k1+k2+m∑
k3=0
(
k3 −m
)
!
(
k1 + k2 + k2 +m
)
!k1! (k4 − k1 − k2 − 1)!
k1!k2!k3!3N+b+k1+k2−k3+m−34N+d+k3+m−3
(19)
B2=

S{1,1,4,6},S{1,1,5,5},S{1,2,3,6},S{1,3,3,5},
S{1,2,4,5},S{1,3,4,4},S{2,2,2,6},S{2,2,3,5},
S{2,2,4,4},S{2,3,3,4},S{3,3,3,3}
 (16)
where S{·} represents the permutation of the elements of set.
The specific function f can be shown from Eq. (17) to Eq. (20)
where k1 = NNT+ c− 4, k2 = NNT+ b− 4, k3 = NNT+
a+m− 4, k4 = NNT+ d+ k1+ k2+ k3+m− 3 and K2 =
Γ (NNT + a− 3) Γ (NNT + d− 3). Γ (·) is the Gamma
function. Note that the other function f1,4,1,1 (a, b, c, d),
f1,4,0,n (a, b, c, d) and f1,4,m,0 (a, b, c, d) can be found in [30].
K satisfies K = 112(NNT−1)!(NNT−2)!(NNT−3)!(NNT−4)! and
Ba,b,c,d is shown in Eq. (21).
2) Analytical Solution of γ: Inspired from the method
in [30], we consider the joint PDF of any eigenvalue (except
the smallest one) and the smallest one can be approximated
similarly, that is, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3,
fλi,λ4 (x, y) =
1
2piξλiξλ4
√
1− ρ2i
exp
{
− κi
2(1− ρi)2
}
(22)
where ξλi denote the standard deviation of the eigenvalue
λi and can be derived in Eq. (13). ρi is the correlation
coefficient between λi and λ4. The parameter ρi is given by
ρi =
ζλi,λ4−ζλiζλ4
ξλiξλ4
, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and κi is extended as:
κi =
(x− ζλi)2+2ρiξλiξλ4 (x− ζλi) (y − ζλ4) +(y − ζλ4)2
ξ2λiξ
2
λ4
(23)
where ζλi denote the expectation of λi and ζλi,λ4 represent
the expectation of two-variate variable λi and λ4.
More accurately, we compare the joint PDF generation using
the approximation approach with that using the empirical
approach by simulations under NNT = 20. Specifically,
Fig. 4(a) illustrates the one using approximation approach
whereas Fig. 4(b) shows the one based on the empirical
approach. We can see that the PDFs under two methods are
almost in agreement provided that the mean and the variance of
the eigenvalues and correlation between them can be obtained.
Based on the approximated PDFs and given threshold
γi, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the ratio
8f3,4,1,1 (a, b, c, d) =
k3−m∑
k1=0
k2+k1∑
k2=0
k1+k2+m∑
k3=0
(
k3 −m
)
!
(
k2 + k1
)
!
(
k1 +m+ k2
)
! (k4 − k1 − k2 − 1)!
k1!k2!k3!2k2+k1−k2+13k1+k2−k3+m+14k4−k1−k2
(20)
between λi and λ4, denoted by Fi (γi), can be expressed by
Fi (γi) = Φ
{
ζλ4γi−ζλi
ξλiξλ4χ(γi)
}
, χ (γi) =
√
γ2
i
ξ2
λi
− 2ρiγi
ξλiξλ4
+ 1
ξ2
λ4
.
Here Φ {·} denotes CDF of a standard Gaussian random
variable. We then can determine γi by γi
∆
= fi (NNT) =
ζλiζλ4−τ
2
i ρiξλiξλ4+τi
√
δi−2ρiξλiξλ4ζλiζλ4
ζ2
λ4
−τ2
i
ξ2
λ4
where δi = ζ
2
λi
ξ2λ4 +
ζ2λ4ξ
2
λi
+
(
ρ2i − 1
)
τ2i ξ
2
λi
ξ2λ4 , τi = Φ
−1 {Fi (γi)}.
The optimal γ should make all the expression forms of PF
in Eq. (12) approach the values that are as small as possible.
Theorem 1. Given an upper bound of PF, denoted by P
and with arbitrary value, the decision threshold γ able to
guarantee 1− Fi (γ) ≤ P, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ 3 is given by:
γ = max {γ∗1 , γ∗2 , γ∗3} (24)
where γ∗i satisfies Fi (γ
∗
i ) = 1 − P . And NNT achieving γ
can be calculated according to:
NNT = f
−1
iopt
(γ) (25)
where iopt = argmax
i
γ∗i
The verification of this theorem is easy since Fi is a
monotonically-increasing function of γ. We compare the PF
performance of three detectors in Fig. 4(c) where two different
approaches are respectively simulated, that is, the Monte Carlo
simulation and Gaussian approximation. NNT is configured
to be 20. As shown in the figure, PF curves using theoretical
approximation match well with those under practical simula-
tion. Three types of PF gradually decreases to be zero as well,
with the increase of γ.
D. Formulation of Detection Based Binary Number System
Basically, theorem 1 provides a quantitative method for
measuring how many subcarriers are required in one block
for precise coding with zero PF and perfect PD. Therefore,
we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The number N∗ of subcarriers in one subcar-
rier block that are enabled to precisely carry binary number
information can be calculated from the Eq. (25) by configuring
P to be an arbitrarily small value.
Generally, when we define the total number of subcarriers
allocated for channel estimation as NTotal, typically equal to
several hundreds, N∗ satisfies N∗ = NTotal/B.
To verify the proposition, let us turn to a 3D plot of PD and
PF versus the threshold γ and NNT in Fig. 5(a). As we can
see, with NNT = 60, γ = 3, PF is equal to zero while the PD
is always maintained to be 1 for all the three detectors. In this
sense, N∗NT = 60 is enough for precise coding when γ = 3.
A control variable NB is defined by
NB
∆
=N∗NT = NTotalNT/B (26)
Therefore, we know that any block configured with NB ≥ 60
can carry binary number information precisely. When each
block satisfies those requirements, each code digit ci that
corresponds to the i-th subcarrier block is endowed with the
following binary number:
ci =
{
1 if there exist signals
0 otherwise
(27)
VI. KEY TECHNIQUE II: CODE CONSTRUCTION
On the basis of coded subcarrier blocks, we, in this section,
develop a CFBG coding theory to construct a binary group
code with fixed length and constant weight.
A. Binary Arithmetic Rule Between Codewords
The binary arithmetic rule between any two codewords to
be designed is necessary and should be able to represent the
overlapping operation precisely. Intuitively, two rules on the
code-frequency domain can be identified and mathematically
interpreted as follows:
Definition 1. The superposition (SP) sum z = xV y (desig-
nated as the digit-by-digit Boolean sum) of two B-dimensional
binary vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xB) and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yB)
is defined by:
zi =
{
0 if xi = yi = 0
1 otherwise
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ B (28)
and we say that a binary vector x includes a binary vector y
if the Boolean sum satisfies yV x = x
Definition 2. The algebraic superposition (ASP) sum (des-
ignated as the digit-by-digit sum) is defined by d = xV y in
Ba,b,c,d =

−6 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ {S{0,4,4,4} ∪ S{2,3,3,4}}
−4 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ S{1,3,3,5}
1 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ S{0,2,4,6}
2 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ {S{0,3,4,5} ∪ S{1,2,3,6}}
4 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ {S{1,1,5,5} ∪ S{1,3,4,4} ∪ S{2,2,3,5} ∪ S{2,2,4,4}}
24 {a, b, c, d} ⊆ S{3,3,3,3}
−2 otherwise
(21)
9which two B-dimensional binary vectors x = (x1, x2, . . . , xB)
and y = (y1, y2, . . . , yB) satisfy:
di = xi + yi, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ B (29)
B. Coding Principle
Establishment of CFBG coding on the basis of the formu-
lated binary code requires us to thoroughly analyze the issues
induced by specific superposition rules. We attempt to achieve
pilot conveying using binary code satisfying the principle of
SP sum. In this case, several key coding principles constrained
by Problem 2 can be identified.
First, we have to admit that Eva can launch randomly-
imitating attack, namely, selecting randomly one codeword in
the same publicly-known code as Bob (or Charlie) and acti-
vating subcarrier blocks as the codeword indicates. Therefore,
we hope to guarantee that each superposition of up to three
different codewords is unique and each superimposed code-
word can be uniquely and correctly decomposed into original
codewords. To achieve this, we propose two principles:
Principle 1. Every sum of up to three different codewords can
be decomposed by no codeword other than those used to form
the sum.
Principle 2. Every sum of up to three different codewords is
distinct from every other sum of three or fewer codewords.
Remark 3. Thanks to the sum operation for up to three
different codewords, proposed CFBG method applies to single-
user scenario threaten by an additional attacker Eva.
The code satisfying the two principles can be divided by
two independent codes, respectively for Bob and Charlie, thus
distinguishing their own codewords from each other. In this
way, the silence of Eva, if exists, can be detected since any
superimposition from extra codewords will induce a complete
new observation codeword at Alice, therefore indicating the
existence of an attack.
Randomly-imitating attack is also enabled to be detected
perfectly since any extra duplicate codeword can transform
original superposition codewords ( superimposed by Bob and
Charlie) into a novel distinct and identifiable codeword in
the code. This is determined by the two principles, which is,
however, unreliable when a wideband jamming attack happens.
Problem 4. When a wideband jamming attack happens, the
interpreted codeword at Alice is a vector with all elements“1”
which carry no information useful for Alice. The codewords
decomposed from the superimposed codeword under the attack
may also belong to the code. In this case, Alice will ignore
jamming attack and make a wrong decision that there exists
no attack.
To solve this issue, we reconsider the two principles and
discover an important property, that is,
Property 1. For every sum of up to three different codewords
within the code, if we reduce by one any codeword digit
indicating single signal on the subcarrier block, the resulted
codeword can be decomposed by no codeword in the code.
This requires the previous block detection technique com-
bined with the process of code design. We stress that this
property can resolve Problem 4 and its effectiveness can be
interpreted by the following fact:
Fact 2. Under jamming attack, any superimposed digit indi-
cating single signal on a subcarrier block logically suggests
that the digits previously exploited by Bob and Charlie at the
same position are both of zero value. Therefore, if we reduce
those digits to be zero, the weight of interpreted codewords
is unchanged. The interpreted codewords will belong to the
original codebook. Otherwise when there is no jamming
attack, we can know that there exist non-zero digits exploited
by Bob and/or Charlie at the same digit positions and any
reduction of those digits will induce the interpreted codeword
of less weight as well. In this case, the interpreted codeword
will never belong to the predesigned code and finally we can
distinguish whether jamming attack happens.
In summary, the two principles not only guarantee the iden-
tification and classification for hybrid attack, but also provide
the basic functionalities of codeword conveying, separation
and identification. Obviously, those principles combined with
block detection technique constitute the core of CFBG code.
C. Construction of CFBG Codebook
First, we construct the codebook satisfying the above two
principles through a well-known ZFD code proposed in [31].
Its definition is given as follows:
Definition 3. A ZFD code C with order m is defined by a
collection of C B-dimensional binary vectors ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ C
for which no SP sum c1V c2V...V ck of k ≤ m codewords
includes any other codeword not used in this sum.
Intuitively, the definition of ZFD code satisfies the Prin-
ciple 1. Based on the definition, we know that any sum
c1V c2V...V ck of k ≤ m codewords cannot include the
superposition sum of any other codewords, for instance,
cj1V cj2V...V cjk , k ≤ m with {1, . . . , k} 6= {j1, . . . ,jk},
since each of the other codewords cannot be included in the
sum. Therefore, Principle 2 can be guaranteed by:
Proposition 2. For a ZFD code C with orderm, two arbitrary
SP sums each of which is superimposed by k ≤ m code words
are identical if and only if the two codeword sets respectively
constituting the two sums are completely identical as well.
Second, we define the concept of BD code satisfying
Property 1 by the following:
Definition 4. A BD code B is the one that has the same
codewords as ZFD code but follows ASP sum principle.
Finally, we focus on the construction of two codes and show
how to construct the CFBG codebook by integrating the two
codes. Let us begin by introducing the ZFD code construction.
1) Relationship between maximum-distance separable
(MDS) and ZFD code and theoretical results: An arbitrary
m-order ZFD code is constructed on the basis of m-order
MDS code. We consider a m order B-digit ZFD code with
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Fig. 5. Detection performance and CFBG codebook performance; (a) PD and PF versus different NTN and γ. Note that we can configure N = 1, that is,
one subcarrier in one block, and in this sense, the curves indicate the performance of PD and PF versus γ and NT; (b) SEP performance versus NT and
NTotal; (c) Tradeoff curves: NTotal versus NT under fixed SEP.
the constant weight. Generally, MDS code is an efficient way
to construct the ZFD code since each of codewords belonging
to MDS code exactly occurs once in the overall code set [32].
Basically, MDS code is a q-nary error-correcting code whose
codeword digits are members of a set of q basic symbols.
MDS code has the maximum possible distance d = r + 1 for
given code size C = qk and codeword length n = k + r.
A m order B-digit ZFD code can be constituted from a
q-nary B/q-digit MDS code by representing each digit of
codeword with a unique weight-one binary q-tuple. For
example, the q-nary symbols 0, 1, . . . q − 1 are to be
replaced by the q-digit binary vectors 1, 0, . . . , 0, 0, 1, . . . , 0,
0, 0, . . . , 1 respectively. In this context, the code size satisfies
the following relationships:
C = qk,m =
n− 1
k − 1 , q ≥ m (k − 1) ≥ 3, n = B/q (30)
where m ∈ Z+, n ∈ Z+. Furthermore, m = 3, B = NTotalNT
NB
has to be satisfied given three wireless nodes at most. The
constraint of 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 1, 2 ≤ r ≤ q − 1 is also imposed
due to MDS property [32].
Theorem 2. The size of MDS based ZFD code satisfies:
C = qk,
NT
NB
=
q (3k − 2)
NTotal
, 2 ≤ k ≤ q + 3
3
, q ≥ 3 (31)
Proof. First, since m = n−1
k−1 = 3 and n = B/q , we can
easily derive NT
NB
= q(3k−2)
NTotal
. Then we focus on the range of
parameter k. Combing q ≥ m (k − 1) ≥ 3 with 2 ≤ k ≤ q−1,
we can derive 2 ≤ k ≤ q+33 when q ≥ 3 . Furthermore, we
consider the constraint 2 ≤ r ≤ q − 1. Since r = n − k =
2k − 2, we have k ≤ q+12 . Comparing the upper bound q+33
and q+12 , we can finally determine the range of k satisfying
2 ≤ k ≤ q+33 given q ≥ 3. The theorem is proved.
Remark 4. For single-user scenario, m is set to be 2 and
the above method still holds true but with the consideration of
different parameter configurations. In this case, we can easily
have C = qk, NT
NB
= q(2k−1)
NTotal
, 3 ≤ k ≤ q+22 , q ≥ 4.
Based on the above theoretical support, we aim to construct
the ZFD code in details.
2) Construction of ZFD code: Firstly, we exploit the con-
cept of Latin hypercubes defined in the following.
Definition 5. A Latin k-dimensional cube of order q is a k-
dimensional matrix
Lk,q = |q (i1, i2, . . . , ik) ; 1 ≤ i1, i2, . . . , ik ≤ q| (32)
such that every row is a permutation of the set of natural
numbers 1, 2, . . . , q. By a row of Lk,q we mean an q-tuple
of elements q (i1, i2, . . . , ik) which have identical coordinates
k − 1 at places
Using the definition of Latin hypercube, we then have the
definition of orthogonal Latin hypercubes with N (q) tuples.
Definition 6. A N (q)-tuple of Latin k-dimensional cubes[
L
k,q
l = |ql (i1, i2, . . . , ik) ; 1 ≤ i1, i2, . . . , ik ≤ q|
]
(33)
of order q for l = 1, 2, . . . , N (q) is called mutually orthog-
onal, if whenever i1, i2, . . . , ik, i
′
1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}
are such that
ql (i1, i2, . . . , ik) = ql
(
i
′
1, i
′
2, . . . , i
′
k
)
, for all 1 ≤ l ≤ N (q)
(34)
then we must have ii = i
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , k . N (q) repre-
sents the maximum number of orthogonal Latin k-dimensional
cubes of order q.
The existence of orthogonal Latin k-dimensional cubes of
order q can be guaranteed by the following theorem
Theorem 3. For ∀k, k ≥ 3 and ∀q, q ≥ 3, there exists a set
of k orthogonal Latin k-dimensional cubes of order q.
Then, we choose k = 3 to construct the orthogonal Latin
cubes. The relationship between orthogonal Latin cubes and
MDS code is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. A q-nary MDS code with C = q3 and d = r+1
is equivalent to a set of r orthogonal Latin cubes of order q
with q ≥ 3, r = N (q).
Proof. Suppose we have a set of r orthogonal Latin three-
dimensional cubes of order q. We first number the elements
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Fig. 6. Diagram of CFBG code construction process, including MDS
code construction, ZFD code construction and BD code construction. In the
beginning, MDS code is constructed through 3 orthogonal 6-order Latin cubes.
There exist a total of six Latin cubes that are formulated by performing cyclic
permutation for three 6-order orthogonal Latin squares for six times. For each
Latin square, each of columns undergoes cyclic permutation simultaneously.
Note that a Latin square is a square array in which each row and each column
consists of the same set of entries without repetition. Two n × n l-order
Latin squares, denoted by X = [xij ] and Y = [yij ], 1 ≤ xij , yij ≤ l,
xij , yij ∈ Z
+, are orthogonal iff n2 pairs (xij , yij) are all different. Then
ZFD code is constructed as the method mentioned in Theorem 4 and BD code
is constructed by copying ZFD code but with different sum principle.
of three independent dimensions of 3-D cubes ( denoted by
D1 D2 and D3, respectively) using the same q symbols from
which the cubes are formed. Then we construct a q3 codewords
supported code by using D1 for the first position, D2 for the
second, D3 for the third and the corresponding cube entries
for the remaining r positions. Two codewords with three
different digits at the first three positions cannot agree in the
last r positions, since each of codewords designed from the
orthogonal Latin cubes occurs exactly once. Furthermore, if
two code words agree in either two of the first three positions,
they can agree in none of the last r, since each of the q symbols
appears exactly once in any row or column of an arbitrary 2-
dimensional slice of Latin cubes. Similarly, if two code words
agree in any one of the first three positions, they can also
agree in none of the last r, since each of the paired q symbols
(totally q2 symbols) on the 2-dimensional plane of a Latin
cube appears exactly once in the set.
Finally, each MDS codeword is formulated by searching the
three dimensions of Latin cubes for the first k digits and then
filling out the remnant r positions with the searched value
indicated by the three digits in the cube. MDS codeword is
further extended as the ZFD codeword by replacing each digit
with the corresponding q-digit binary vectors.
3) Construction of CFBG Codebook: After constructing
ZFD code, BD code can be obtained according to Definition
4. Thereafter, we formulate a CFBG codebook as follows:
Proposition 3. A CFBG codebook G is a double-codeword
(DCW) codebook defined by:
G=
{[
gC,i gB,i
] ∣∣∣∣ gC,i = gB,i,gC,i ∈ C,gB,i ∈ B,1 ≤ i ≤ C
}
(35)
And the superposition sum of DCWs in G is defined as the
two independent superposition sums where the sum between
the first columns obeys SP sum principle while that between
the second columns follows ASP sum principle.
An example of CFBG construction under order q = 6
is given in the Fig. 6. As previously introduced, the CFBG
codebook is equally divided into two independent codebooks,
respectively denoted by GBob for Bob and GCha for Charlie.
The superposition sum set of codewords in G is defined by:
Definition 7. The superposition sum set Gk−1 for k = 2, 3
is defined as the collection of all the superposition sums of
DCWs in G, taken exactly k at a time.
D. Codebook Performance
In order to measure the codebook performance, we develop
the concept of SEP, that is, the existence probability of
duplicate codewords among the decomposed codewords.
Theorem 5. The SEP of Alice, that is, when Eva randomly se-
lects one codeword in CFBG codebook for randomly-imitating
attack, is derived as:
SEP =
1
C
∝
(
1
NTotalNT
)k
, k = 3 (36)
Proof. let us consider the number of possible choices of
codewords for the three independent nodes. As we know, Eva
can attack arbitrary node but Bob and Charlie only focus
on their own codebook for distinguishing themselves from
each other. Since each codeword is randomly selected, the
total number of the choices is equal to C2 × C2 × C whereas
the duplicate codewords occur with C2 × C2 possibilities.
Therefore, we have SEP = 1
C
. Now we know k = 3 and
since C = qk, NT
NB
= q(3k−2)
NTotal
, we can derive the SEP by
SEP =
(
7NB
NTotalNT
)3
. As shown in Eq. (26), the control
variable NB is artificially configured and usually fixed. In this
sense, we prove the theorem.
To simulate SEP, SEPdB is defined as follows:
SEPdB = 10log10SEP (37)
We configure NB to be 100. Note that at most NT = 100
antennas are supported in this example. The number of anten-
nas is however not constrained, if needed. Fig. 5(b) shows the
value of SEPdB versusNT andNTotal. As we can see, SEPdB
decreases with the increase of NT and NTotal. This accords
with what is shown in Eq. (36). Specifically, the SEPdB
reaches -56 under NT = 100 and NTotal = 500. Fig. 5(c)
demonstrates the tradeoff between NT and NTotal given
the value of SEPdB. Obviously, the number of subcarriers
occupied for guaranteeing a desirable SEPdB is reduced with
the increase of the number NT of antennas. This reduction
increases with the decrease of SEPdB.
VII. KEY TECHNIQUE III: PILOT ENCODING & DECODING
We introduce the pilot encoding and decoding process
through the formulated codebook. An example can be shown
in Fig. 7. Finally, we will identify the unsolved issues.
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Fig. 7. Example of pilot encoding and decoding process by using CFBG DCW codebook under randomly-imitating attack.
1) Pilot Quantization and Encoding: The common phase
interval [0, 2pi) is equally quantized into C reference values.
Then an one-to-one mapping is formulated between each
phase value and a corresponding codeword. Every time Bob
(or Charlie) has utilized a random pilot, such as θk0 ( or
βk0 ) at one symbol time (i.e., k0) , it compares the phase
with reference values, selects the reference value θk0 (or
βk0 ) closest to the utilized phase and maps the value into a
codeword. Finally, two codebooks denoted by GBob and GCha
are respectively allocated for Bob and Charlie. Bob selects
gC,1, Charlie selects gC,2 and Eva, if existing, selects gC,3.
2) Block Pattern Activating: Bob (or Charlie) maps gC,1
(or gC,2) into the subcarrier block activation patterns. The
principle is that Bob (or Charlie) transmits signals on the i-th
subcarrier block if the i-th (1 ≤ i ≤ B) row element of gC,1
(gC,2) is equal to 1, otherwise Bob (or Charlie) keeps silent
on this subcarrier block.
3) Block Pattern Interpreting: Due to the overlapping of
activation patterns from three nodes, the interpretation of
this pattern into original codewords requires the combination
of block detection technique and CFBG code. The detailed
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
4) Pilot Decoding Based on Interpreted Codewords: Alice
identifies the interpreted codewords as quantized pilot phases,
i.e., θk0 and βk0 and finally recovers the pilot signals.
For this process, what is certain is that three types of attack
can be identified perfectly. As to the codeword identification,
we will encounter three situations: 1) When Eva keeps silence,
two pilots from legitimate nodes can be separated and iden-
tified; 2) Under jamming attack, partial pilots, i.e. belonging
to Bob and Charlie, can be separated and identified, which
is enough for the following channel estimation; 3) Under
randomly-imitating attack, we have the following problem:
Problem 5. Two interpreted codewords within the same code-
book, though separated from each other, cannot be identified.
Thanks to CFBG codebook, what we can achieve until now
is conveying and separating pilots perfectly while identifying
pilots with a certain level of errors. We should note that high-
resolution codeword separation logically acts as a necessary
step towards high-resolution pilot identification and provides
a basis of identification enhancement in the following section.
VIII. KEY TECHNIQUE IV: JOINT CHANNEL ESTIMATION
AND IDENTIFICATION
In order to solve above issue and further achieve the critical
and final goal, i. e., channel acquisition, we focus on the
channel estimation process. Generally, when there is no attack,
a well-known LS estimator is enough for channel estimation.
Therefore, we in this section turn to the attack environment.
We aim to: 1) design the high-precision channel estimator;
2) design a pilot (or channel) identification enhancement
mechanism for randomly-imitating attack.
A. Signal Representation for Channel Estimation
We begin our discussion by stacking the signals received
within the first three OFDM symbol time as
Y = XH+N (38)
Here, we have Y =
[
yT [k0] y
T [k1] y
T [k2]
]T
, X =[
xB xC xE
]
andN =
[
wT [k0] w
T [k1] w
T [k2]
]
.
There exist xj =
[
xj [ki]0≤i≤2
]T
∈ C3×1,
j ∈ {B,C,E} and H=[ hTB hTC hTE ]T. We define
hj = gj
(
INT ⊗ FTL
)
, j ∈ {B,C,E} where gj =[ (
h1j
)T
, . . . ,
(
hNTj
)T ] ∈ C1×NTL, j ∈ {B,C,E}. It
is easily to verify hjh
H
j = Ngjg
H
j , j ∈ {B,C,E}. Then
we define gHj = (Rj ⊗ IL)
1
2 g˜Hj , j ∈ {B,C,E}, where each
g˜j ∼ CN (0, INTL) for j ∈ {B,C,E} is a 1 × NTL vector.
Finally we derive the relationship between FS and CIR as
follows
hj = g˜j
(
R
1
2
j ⊗ FTL
)
, j ∈ {B,C,E} (39)
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Algorithm 1 BDCD Algorithm
Input: Observation codeword g =
[
gC gB
]
, GBob, GCha.
Output: Original codewords: gC,1, gC,2, and gC,3.
1: for g do
2: In the set G ∪G1 ∪G2, find the codeword equal to gC.
3: if True then
4: if Each digit of gC is equal to one then
5: Calculate the element gB,i of gB
6: if There exist i such that gB,i = 1 then
7: Based on Property 1, reduce each digit of gC
at the same digit positions by one. Search the
resulted codeword in G ∪ G1 ∪ G2 again.
8: if True then
9: Indicate jamming attack. Output gC,1, gC,2.
10: else
11: Indicate no attack. Output gC,1, gC,2, gC,3.
12: end if
13: else
14: Indicate jamming attack. Output gC,1, gC,2.
15: end if
16: else
17: Interpret g as original codewords using Princi-
ple 1& 2.
18: if Number of decomposed codewords is three then
19: Output gC,1, gC,2, gC,3.
20: end if
21: if Number of decomposed codewords is two then
22: Eatimate the codeword
[
gC,i,1 gB,i,1
]
from
GBob and
[
gC,i,2 gB,i,2
]
from GCha . Detect
each digit of gB,i,1 and gB,i,2 and calculate the
sum of digits respectively as s1 and s2.
23: if s1 = s2 then
24: Indicate no error and Output gC,i,1, gC,i,2.
25: else
26: Indicate separation error.
27: end if
28: end if
29: end if
30: else
31: Indicate jamming attack. Reduce each digit of g by
one and output gC,1, gC,2 by searching G ∪G1 ∪G2.
32: end if
33: end for
From the Lemma B.26 in [33], we derive the asymptotic
approximation for FS channels j ∈ {B,C,E} by
1
NTN
hjh
H
j
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
1
NT
Tr (Rj ⊗ IL) = LNTTr (Rj).
Similarly, we can obtain the following asymptotic
results: 1
NTN
hjh
H
l
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
0, ∀j 6= l, j, l ∈ {B,C,E},
1
NTN
w [ki]w
H [kj ]
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
σ2, ∀i = j, and
1
NTN
w [ki]w
H [kj ]
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
0, ∀i 6= j. We consider the
covariance matrix defined by CY =
1
NTN
YY
H
satisfying:
C
Y
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
L
NT
XRXH + σ2I2 (40)
where R = diag
{
Tr (RB) Tr (RC) Tr (RE)
}
B. Design of Channel Estimator
Using CFBG codebook and demapping operation, Al-
ice derives two separated pilot phases θk0 and βk0 ,
and thus deduce the first two columns of X, de-
noted by xi for the i-th column, expressed by: x1 =[ √
ρBe
jθk0
√
ρBe
j(θk0+θ) √ρBej(θk0+2θ)
]T
, x2 =[ √
ρCe
jβk0
√
ρCe
j(βk0+β)
√
ρCe
j(βk0+2β)
]T
The de-
sign principle is to derive FS and CIR based on CY and xi.
From Eq. (40), we can derive the MMSE semi-blind estima-
tors for FS channels as WF,B =
√
LTr(RB)
NT
xH1 C
−1
Y
,WF,C =√
LTr(RC)
NT
xH2 C
−1
Y
. The estimated versions of FS channels are
respectively derived by ĥB=WF,BY and ĥC=WF,CY. In
the following, we first eliminate the influence of FFT weight
by multiplying ĥj , j ∈ {B,C} by a right-weighting matrix
INT ⊗
{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−1}
. The result is then multiplied by
R
− 12
j ⊗ IL, j ∈ {B,C} to eliminate the influence of spatial
correlation. Finally, the CIR estimations are derived as
ĝj=ĥj
{
R
− 12
j ⊗
{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−1}}
, j ∈ {B,C} (41)
C. Identification Enhancement
For randomly-imitating attack, CFBG codebook provides
three separated pilots. Three estimated channels can thus
be derived using the above same principle. In this context,
channel identification is equivalent to pilot identification since
each estimator only relies on one corresponding pilot signal.
For simplicity, we denote Eva’s pilot signal recovered by:
x3 =
[ √
ρEe
jϕk0
√
ρEe
j(ϕk0+ϕ)
√
ρEe
j(ϕk0+2ϕ)
]T
(42)
where ϕk0 is the recovered pilot phase indicated by the
confusing codeword. Its estimation version of CIR satisfies
ĝE=ĥE
{
R
− 12
E ⊗
{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−1}}
(43)
Since CFBG codebook guarantees that Alice can identify
which node is under randomly-imitating attack, we turn to
design of the identification mechanism for those channels
under attack. Take Bob for example, we aim to identify ĝB
and ĝE by applying maximum-likelihood detection (MLD) and
the available spatial correlation. The operation for Charlie, if
being misguided, has the same methodology. Note that the
probability distribution of gB is available at Alice and given
in [29] by pgB (r) =
exp[− 12 r(R
−1
B ⊗IL)r
H]
(2pi)NTL/2|RB⊗IL|
1/2
. After deriving
the conditional density pgB (r |RB ) based on RB, we con-
struct the likelihood function In (pgB (r |RB )) and formulate
the identification problem as ĥ=argmax
r=ĝB,ĝE
{In (pgB (r |RB ))}
which is then equivalently transformed into
ĥ=argmin
r=ĝB,ĝE
{
r
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
rH
}
(44)
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Fig. 8. Performance evaluation of channel estimation and identification; (a)UMSE versus SNR and B; (b)3D plot of IEP versus the mean AoA separations
under NT = 64; (c) UMSE of FS and CIR estimation versus SNR under various power difference.
Then the IEP is finally defined by:
PrIEP = Pr
{
ĝB
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
ĝHB > ĝE
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
ĝHE
}
(45)
Proposition 4. The asymptotic IEP when NT → ∞ is given
by:
Pr∞IEP = Pr
{
ATr
(
R−2B
)
> BTr
(
R−1E R
−1
B
)}
(46)
where A = 1 − LTr (RB)xH1 Cx1
/
NT, B = 1 −
LTr (RC)x
H
3 Cx3
/
NT and C =
(
L
NT
XRXH + σ2I2
)−1
.
Proof. There exists ĝB
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
ĝHB =
ĥB
{
R−2B ⊗
{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−2
FTL
}}
ĥHB . It is easily
shown that ĥB = hB −
√
Ah where there exists
A = 1 − LTr (RB)xH1 E
{
C−1
Y
}
x1
/
NT.
√
Ah
is the estimation error that is uncorrelated with
hB. The entries of h are i.i.d zero-mean complex
Gaussian with unity variance. Therefore, we have
ĝB
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
ĝHB = hBRh
H
B − 2AhRhHB +AhRhH where
R = R−2B ⊗
{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−2
FTL
}
. After simplifying
each term using asymptotic approximation, we derive
ĝB
(
R−1B ⊗ IL
)
ĝHB
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
LTr
{
R−1B
}
+ATr
{
R
}
.
Similarly, we have ĝE
(
R−1E ⊗ IL
)
ĝHE
a.s.−−−−−→
NT→∞
LTr
{
R−1B
}
+ BTr
{
R˜
}
where R˜ = R
− 12
E R
−1
B R
− 12
E ⊗{(
FTL
)H(
FTLF
∗
L
)−2
FTL
}
. Based on those equations, the
proposition can be easily proved.
We use the asymptotic analysis as a tool to provide tight
approximations for finite NT [33]. As shown in Fig. 8(b),
not very large antenna, i.e., NT = 64, can bring the precise
decision. For massive MIMO systems, generally with antennas
of 128 or more, those asymptotic approximation results are
precise enough for our calculation. Proposition 4 provides a
mathematical support of the theoretical limit that pilot iden-
tification enhancement can bring under randomly-imitating
attack.
In what follows, we stimulate the performance of chan-
nel estimation and identification using proposed estima-
tors. We consider uniform linear array (ULA) with spac-
ing d = λ/2 and NT ≥ 8. All the spatial correlation
matrices are generated such that the spatial correlation be-
tween any two antennas at each path can be given by
ρ (θ0, d)=
∫ pi
−pi
e
−j2pid sin(θ−θ0)
λ P (θ − θ0) dθ where θ0 denotes
the mean AoA and P denotes the channel power angle
spectrum (PAS) that is modeled by Truncated Gaussian dis-
tribution [34], [35]. The mean AoA of Bob, Charlie and
Eva, respectively denoted by θB0 , θ
C
0 and θ
E
0 , are generated
independently and distributed identically within [−pi, pi]. For
the channel estimation part, we consider NTotal = 128
subcarriers are occupied by pilot tones. We assume Bob
and Charlie have the same transmission power, i. e., ρB =
ρC = ρ and define SNR = P
/
σ2. We also define the
user average MSE (UMSE) of FS and CIR estimation re-
spectively as E
{∥∥∥ĥB − hB∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥ĥC − hC∥∥∥2}/2NNT and
E
{
‖ĝB − gB‖2 + ‖ĝC − gC‖2
}/
2NNT. For the identifica-
tion simulations, since Eva can flexibly choose to attack any
nodes, we define the identification error region (IER) as the
set of all the collections of
(
θB0 − θE0 , θC0 − θE0
)
such that
PrIEP > 0 is satisfied for Bob and/or Charlie. Correspond-
ingly, the perfect identification region (PIR) is defined as the
set making PrIEP = 0.
Fig. 8(a) presents the UMSE performance of CIR estimation
versus SNR and different number B of subcarrier blocks. L
is configured to be 6 and Eva is assumed to be with same
SNR as Bob and Charlie. As we can see, traditional pilot
spoofing attack causes a high-UMSE floor on CIR estimation
for Bob and Charlie. However, the proposed mechanism breaks
down this floor and its UMSE gradually decreases with the
increase of transmit antennas. Moreover, we find that the
UMSE under proposed estimators approaches the level under
perfect MMSE with the increase of antennas. On the other
hand, the case without quantization serves as an another
performance benchmark. It can be shown that the UMSE
gradually decreases with the increase of B and B = 5 is
enough to guarantee Alice a desirable UMSE, like the one
under no quantization.
Fig. 8(b) shows the IEP versus the mean AoA separation
15
under NT = 64. The simulation is averaged over 1000 runs,
each of which performs 1000 channel average. As we can see,
IER is composed by the special points for which at least one
of its axes has zero value. It means that the available PIR
can be extensively achieved unless any legitimate node has
the same average AoA as Eva. Fig. 8(c) shows the UMSE
performance of FS and CIR estimation versus SNR under
various power difference relative to Eva. L is configured to
be 8 and B is set to be 5. As we can see, the UMSE is not
influenced by the power of Eva, even with 30dB larger than
Bob or Charlie, under bothNT = 100 andNT = 8. The reason
is that the interference can be eliminated naturally from the
received signal space when the dimension of signals observed
is no more than the number of OFDM symbol time in use.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed a CFBG based PA mechanism
for a two-user OFDM system to protect the channel estimation
over frequency-selective channels. In this scheme, the values
of pilot tones were randomized to avoid the pilot-spoofing
attack but also cause a serious hybrid attack. To resolve those
problems in a unique framework, a scheme combing detection,
coding and channel estimation was devised to achieve secure
PA with low SEP and IEP as well as high-accuracy channel
estimation. Some interesting results were presented to verify
the robustness of proposed scheme under hybrid attack modes.
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